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As media and shareholders put a lot of attention on executive compensation of 
listed companies,the amount of executive compensation included in financial 
statement is no longer so “surprise”. But is it mean that executive compensation in 
listed companies has been controlled in a reasonable level? Gul(2011) point out that 
due to increasing attention and regulatory restrictions on cash compensation of 
executives, perks became a new way for executives to misappropriate firm resource to 
derive private benefits. In China Executive perks are widely exist.For example, Kato 
and Long(2006) estimate that perks represent as 15% to 32% of totol executive 
compensation. Chen(2010) further argue that perks are 8 times of average executive 
compensation. A large number of academic studies have found that executive perks is 
harmful to company(Liang,2014) . Due to its negative effect, how to suppress 
executive perks has become important problem that must be addressed. In recent 
years, the construction of the internal control of listed companies in China has become 
a hot topic, the Commission issued a series of guidelines to promote internal control 
system of listed companies. However, listed companies questioned the effectiveness 
of internal control system, therefore internal control self-assessment report failed to 
offer useful information to capital market. (Tian,2012) 
This paper combined normative and empirical research to draw conclusion that 
higher internal control quality can suppress executive perks. First, based on relevant 
theories, this paper explained how high internal control quality can reduce the level of 
executive perks. Then, test this conclusion using data of Chinese listed companies in 
2006 to 2011. I find that higher internal control quality indeed suppress executive 
perks, and the relationship is more obvious in non-SOE companies. Lu et al.(2011) 
found that improving the quality of internal controls will improve the sensitivity 
between executive pay and company performance. That is to say, improving the 















studied the visible executive compensation. In this paper, it is the first time that the 
relationship between internal control system and executive perks had been tested. 
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